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Absztrakt.  
Egy ellátási láncot vizsgálunk egy beszállítóval és egy termelıvel. A termelı kereslete idıben 
ismert. A termelı és a beszállító költségfüggvénye kvadratikus termelési és készlettartási 
költségbıl áll. Ezen kívül értelmezünk egy lineáris beszerzési költséget termelı és a beszállító 
között. A modell ebben az értelmezésben egy differenciáljátékként értelmezhetı. A beszállító 
döntési változója az értékesítési (beszerzési) ár és a termelési rátája, míg a termelınek a 
beszerzési mennyiség és a termelési ráta. A problémát, mint egy Nash-játékot és mint 
kooperatív játékot értelmezzük, amit a Pareto-megoldásként értelmezünk. A feladatot így 
visszavezethetjük egy Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) problémára. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimális irányítás, Ellátási láncok koordinációja, Nagykereskedelmi árszerzıdés, Dinamikus játék 
 
 
Abstract.  
We investigate a supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer knows 
the demand for her product. The product is produced from a product supplied by the supplier. 
The purchased product is stored in a cross-docking way, i.e. there is no inventory of the 
purchased product and the planned production is ordered from the supplier. The costs of the 
manufacturer consist of quadratic inventory holding costs, quadratic production cost, and 
linear purchasing cost. It is assumed that the market price of the end product is known as well, 
so the sales of the producer are calculated. The linear purchasing cost is paid to the supplier. 
The goal of the manufacturer is maximize her cumulated profits. The sales of the supplier are 
the ordering cost of the manufacturer. The costs of the supplier are the quadratic 
manufacturing and inventory holding costs. The goal of the supplier is to maximize the sales 
reduced with the relevant costs. The supplier and the manufacturer want to negotiate about the 
sales price of the supplier and the quantity ordered by the manufacturer. In this paper we will 
not examine the bargaining process which determines the adequate price and quantity. The 
situation is modeled as a differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales 
price and the production quantity of the supplier. The manufacturer will choose the cost 
minimal production plan to minimize her costs, so maximize the cumulated profits. The 
problem is a differential game with two players. The basic problem is a Holt-Modigliani-
Muth-Simon (HMMS) problem extended with linear purchasing costs. We will examine two 
cases: the decentralized Nash-solution and a centralized Pareto-solution to optimize the 
behaviors of the players of the game. 
 
Keywords: Optimal control, Supply chain coordination, Wholesale price contract, Dynamic game 
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1. Introduction 
 
Supply chain coordination is a tool in supply chain to avoid extra costs of the participants in 
the value chain. It is often called as vertical integration. There are a number of tools which 
lead to supply chain or channel coordination. The most important tool of the supply chain 
coordination is the contracts. (See Tsay et al. (1999) and Cachon (2003).) With supply 
contracts the members of a supply chain can avoid or reduce the well-known bullwhip effect. 
In this paper we examine one of the supply chain contracts: the wholesale price contract in a 
dynamic environment. 
 
We investigate a supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer knows 
the demand for her product. The product is produced from a product supplied by the supplier. 
The purchased product is stored in a cross-docking way, i.e. there is no inventory of the 
purchased product and the planned production is ordered from the supplier. The costs of the 
manufacturer consist of quadratic inventory holding costs, quadratic production cost, and 
linear purchasing cost. It is assumed that the market price of the end product is known as well, 
so the sales of the producer are calculated. The linear purchasing cost is paid to the supplier. 
The goal of the manufacturer is maximize her cumulated profits. The sales of the supplier are 
the ordering cost of the manufacturer. The costs of the supplier are the quadratic 
manufacturing and inventory holding costs. The goal of the supplier is to maximize the sales 
reduced with the relevant costs. The basic problem was initiated by Holt et al. (1960). A 
similar problem was analyzed by Dobos (2003) in a HMMS-environment for a reverse 
logistics problem. The bullwhip effect was examined by Dobos (2010) in a HMMS-supply 
chain. 
 
The supplier and the manufacturer want to negotiate about the sales (purchasing) price of the 
supplier and the quantity ordered by the manufacturer. The situation is modeled as a 
differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales price and the production 
quantity of the supplier. The manufacturer will choose the cost minimal production plan to 
minimize her costs, so maximize the cumulated profits. The problem is a differential game 
with two players. The problem is a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS-) type model 
extended with linear purchasing costs. We will examine two cases: the decentralized Nash-
solution and a centralized Pareto-solution to optimize the behaviors of the players of the 
game. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model with assumptions and 
solves the decentralized case with the concept of the differential game. The next chapter 
investigates the cooperative solution, i.e. the participants of the supply chain sums up all of 
the relevant costs and optimize the system-wide problem. In this section we will not 
investigate the sharing of the benefits. In section four we demonstrate the functioning of the 
models with a numerical example. Last we summarize the results of the paper. 
 
2. The decentralized system: The Nash solution 
 
We consider a simple supply chain consisting of two firms: a supplier and a manufacturer. We 
assume that the firms are independent, that is, each makes her decision to minimize her own 
costs. The firms have two stores: a store for raw materials and a store for end products. 
Moreover, we assume that the input stores are empty, that is, the firms can order suitable 
quantity and that they can get the ordered quantity. The production processes have a known, 
constant lead time. The material flow of the model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 4 
 
Figure 1. Material flow in the models 
 
 
The following parameters are used in the models: 
 
T length of the planning horizon, 
S(t) the rate of demand, continuous differentiable, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tIm  inventory goal size of manufactured product, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tI s  inventory goal size of supplied product, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPm  manufacturing goal level, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPs  supply goal level, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
hm inventory holding cost coefficient in manufactured product store, 
hs inventory holding cost coefficient in supplied product store, 
cm production cost coefficient for manufacturing, 
cs production cost coefficient for supply, 
p market price of the product of the manufacturer. 
 
In the HMMS-model it is assumed that the management of the (manufacturer and supplier) 
firms have fixed a production-inventory pattern, that is, the production plans )(tPm  and )(tPs , 
and planned inventory levels )(tIm  and )(tI s  are known before the planning horizon. The 
objective of the managers of the firms is to minimize the deviations from the fixed objective 
level. The deviations are defined, as quadratic functional with known parameters. This 
phenomenon was empirically tested by Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (1960). 
 
The decision variables: 
 
)(tIm  the inventory level of the manufactured product, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tI s  the inventory level of the supplied product, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPm  the rate of manufacturing, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPs  the rate of supply, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
w the purchasing price of the supplied product. 
 
The decentralized model describes the situation where the supplier and the manufacturer 
optimize independently, we mean the manufacturer determines its optimal production-
inventory strategy first (the market demand is given exogenously), then she orders the 
necessary quantity of products to meet the known demand. Then the supplier accepts the order 
and minimizes her own costs.  
Im(t) 
Supplier Manufacturer 
Production Production 
Pm(t) Pm(t) Pm(t) Ps(t) Ps(t) Ps(t) 
Is(t) 
S(t) 
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Next, we model the manufacturer in this HMMS-environment. The manufacturer solves the 
following problem for a given purchasing price wN: 
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The functional (1) is the cumulated profit of the manufacturer. It is easy to see that the 
revenue is a known constant, so the problem can be reformulated, as a cost minimization in 
the next way: 
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Assume that the optimal production-inventory policy of the manufacturer in dependence of 
the purchasing price w is ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ NmNm PI  in model (1’)-(2) and the manufacturer orders )(⋅NmP . 
Then the supplier solves the following problem: 
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Notice that problem (3)-(4) has the same planning horizon [0,T] as that of model (1’)-(2). To 
solve problem (1’)-(2) we apply the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see e.g. Feichtinger 
and Hartl, (1986), Seierstad and Sydsaeter, (1987)). The Hamiltonian function of this problem 
is as follows: 
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This problem is an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To obtain the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality we need the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .),(),(),(),(),(),(),( tIttttPtIHttttPtIL mmmmmmmmmmm ⋅+= λψλψ  
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Lemma 1 ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ NmNm PI  is the optimal solution of problem (1’)-(2) if and only if there exists 
continuous function )(⋅mψ  such that for all 0≤ t≤ T 0)( ≠tmψ  and 
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(c)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt mNmm λλ ,                          
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We do not prove the above lemma; its proof can be found in the above mentioned literature. 
The optimal solution can be easy constructed, if the optimal production rate and the optimal 
inventory level are positive in along the planning horizon. 
 
Lemma 2 Assume that production-inventory strategy ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ NmNm PI  is an optimal solution for 
model (1’)-(2). Then the optimal solution must satisfy the following differential equation: 
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with initial and terminal condition 
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We do not prove this lemma, the proof can be found in Dobos (2003). If production strategy 
)(⋅NmP  is known, then problem (3)-(4) can be solved. 
 
The manufacturer will order from the supplier, if the cumulated profit is nonnegative in the 
planning horizon in dependence of the purchasing price, i.e. 
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If we solve the problem (1)-(2) changing the purchasing price, we achieve an upper bound for 
this price wwN ≤≤0 . This means that the optimal cumulated profit of the manufacturer is 
even zero, if the purchasing price is equal to the upper bound w . 
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After optimal production strategy )(⋅NmP  is given we can solve problem (3)-(4). The 
Hamiltonian function of problem (3)-(4) is as follows 
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This problem is also an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To get 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality, we need again the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).),(),(),(),(),(),(),( tIttttPtIHttttPtIL sssssssssss ⋅+= λψλψ  
 
The proof of the following lemma can be found again in the mentioned literature. 
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For the case of positive inventory level and production rate the optimal strategy is presented 
in the next lemma. 
 
Lemma 4 Let us assume that production-inventory strategy ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ NsNs PI  is an optimal 
solution for model (3)-(4). Then the optimal solution must satisfy the following differential 
equation: 
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Later we use the following notations: let NmJ  and 
N
sJ  be the optimal values of cost functions 
(1) and (3) respectively, that is, let 
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The solutions of the two models are the well-known Nash solution of this game model. This 
connection can be written, as 
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In the next section we investigate the coordinated solution of the examined model. We assume 
that the supplier and manufacturer act as a common firm and minimize the costs together. The 
Nash solution has a property that the profit of the manufacturer is equal to zero. It means that 
all of the profits are realized at the supplier in our model. 
 
3 The centralized system: The Pareto optimal solution 
 
In this section we solve the centralized model, that is, the model, where the manufacturer and 
supplier coordinate their decisions and sum up the relevant profits. The cost functional does 
not depend on the purchasing price in this model. The purchasing price is an inner accounting 
tool of the gains. In this paper we do not investigate the distribution of the profits at the end of 
the planning horizon. The model is as follows 
 
( )
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] min)()(
2
)()(
2
)()(
2
)()(
2
(.)(.),
0
2222
→






−+−+−+−
=
∫ dttPtP
c
tItI
h
tPtP
c
tItI
h
PPJ
T
ss
s
ss
s
mm
m
mm
m
smms
 (5) 
 
s.t. 
 
TttStPtI mm ≤≤−= 0),()()(&         (6) 
 
,0),()()( TttPtPtI mss ≤≤−=&         (7) 
 






=





0
0
)0(
)0(
s
m
s
m
I
I
I
I
          (8) 
 9 
 
The Hamiltonian function of model (5)-(8) is 
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The following lemma formalizes the well-known optimality conditions. Its proof can be found 
in the literature mentioned in the previous section. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT sPss ψψ  
 
The optimal centralized production strategies for the manufacturer and the supplier 
respectively are 
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These two equations are the optimal linear decision rules. (See Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon 
(1960).) Differentiating adjoint variables )(⋅mψ  and )(⋅sψ , and then substituting into the 
conditions, the necessary and sufficient conditions become a system of linear differential 
equations: 
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with initial and ending conditions 
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Finally, consider a notation: let ( )(.)(.), PsPmmsPms PPJJ =  denote the optimal value of cost 
function (5). It is easy to see that NsNmPms JJJ +≤ , i.e. the Pareto solution of the problem has a 
lower cost and a higher profit. 
 
4. A numerical example 
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Take the following parameters and cost functions in problems (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(8), as 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Parameter specification for the example 
 
In the following we solve the decentralized and the centralized problem. 
 
5.1 The solution of the decentralized problem 
 
The decentralized problem is a hierarchical production planning problem. First the 
manufacturer solves her planning problem then the optimal ordering policy is forwarded to 
the supplier. Finally, the supplier optimizes her own relevant costs based on the known 
ordering policy of the manufacturer. 
 
First we determine the upper bound for the purchasing price. If the purchasing price is greater 
than this value, then the manufacturer has a negative profit and she looks for a new supplier 
with a lower purchasing price. The problem of the manufacturer is as follows: 
 
( ) [ ] [ ] min)(1)(
2
15.0)(
2
25
0
22
→






⋅+−+−= ∫ dttPwtPtIwJ mmmm  
 
s.t. 
 
50,25.0)0(,2)sin()()( ≤≤=−−= tIttPtI mmm&  
 
The revenue of the manufacturer is equal to 12.56. The upper bound is 0.4, i.e. 4.0=w . Let 
us now substitute this value of the cost function of the manufacturer. The optimal solution can 
be determined with help of Lemma 2, because the optimal inventory level and production rate 
are positive. Let the optimal the optimal solution be functions )(⋅NmP  and )(⋅NmI . 
 
Description Data 
Length of planning horizon: T 5 
Demand rates: S(t) sin(t)+2 
Delay of the supply: τ 0.5 
Manufacturing rate goal level: )(⋅mP  1.0 
Supply rate goal level: )(⋅sP  0.85 
Inventory size goal level in manufacturing store: )(⋅mI  0.5 
Inventory size goal level in supply store: )(⋅sI  0.3 
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store: )0(mI  0.25 
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store: )0(sI  0.5 
Manufacturing cost coefficient: cm 1.0 
Supply cost coefficient: cs 0.5 
Inventory holding cost coefficient in manufacturing store: hm 2 
Inventory holding cost coefficient in supply store: hs 1 
Sales price of the end product 0.764 
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The minimal cost of the manufacturer is 9.594 units, that is, 594.9=NmJ . The cumulate profit 
is zero. 
 
Figure 2. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the decentralized models 
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In the next step we solve the problem of the supplier, where the manufacturer’s ordering 
policy )(⋅NmP  is given: 
 
[ ] [ ] min85.0)(
2
5.03.0)(
2
1)(4.0
5
0
22
5
0
→






−−−⋅= ∫∫ dttPtIdttPJ ss
N
ms  
 
s.t. 
 
50,5.0)0(),()()( ≤≤=−= tItPtPtI sNmss&  
 
The optimal solution for the supplier is functions )(⋅NsP  and )(⋅NsI , applying the results of 
Lemma 4. 
 
The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PmN(t) 
)(tP Ns  
S(t) 
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Figure 3. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the decentralized 
models 
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The cumulated profit of the supplier is 1.306 units, that is 306.1=NsJ . The total cost of 
manufacturer and supplier is 8.288 units in this decentralized strategy of the supply chain, that 
is 288.8=+ Ns
N
m JJ . 
 
5.2 The solution of the centralized problem 
 
In the following we solve the centralized problem: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] min85.0)(
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2222
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s.t. 
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The optimal solution of this problem is given after the solution of the following differential 
equation (see (9)): 
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with initial and terminal conditions 
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The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the centralized model 
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Figure 5. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the centralized model 
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The minimal cost of the centralized system is 6.887 units, where the manufacturer’s cost is 
4.656 units and the supplier’s cost is 2.231 units, that is, 887.6=cmsJ , 656.4=
c
mJ  and 
231.2=csJ . 
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5.3 Comparison of the solutions of the decentralized and the centralized system 
 
First, compare the production rate and inventory level of the manufacturer and the supplier in 
the cases of the decentralized and the centralized system, where Imdt, Imct, Isdt and Isct are 
for the inventory level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized model respectively. 
 
Figure 6 The inventory level of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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Figure 7 The inventory level of the supplier in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
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In this example the inventory level of the manufacturer decreases in the case of cooperation, 
that is, in the centralized system. The inventory level of the supplier first decreases, and then 
increases when the participants cooperate in the supply chain, see Figures 6 and 7. 
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Figure 8 The production rate of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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As we see, the production level in the centralized system is smoother, that is, the growth of 
the production rate is smaller than that in the case of the decentralized system, and the 
contrary is true for the supplier, that is, in the decentralized system the production rate of the 
supplier is smoother than that in the centralized system, where Pmdt, Pmct, Psdt and Psct are 
for the production level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized models respectively, and S(t) is for the exogenously given demand, see Figures 8 
and 5. This phenomenon is the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized model. 
 
Figure 9 The production rate of manufacturer in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
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The optimal costs of the decentralized and the centralized problem are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The optimal profits of the example 
 
 Decentralized 
problem 
Centralized 
problem 
Manufacturer costs (Jm) 9.594 4.656 
Supplier costs (Js) -1.306 2.231 
Total costs (Jms) 8.288 6.887 
 
 
As we have seen, the total cost of the centralized problem is lower than that of the 
decentralized one. The cost reduction is approximately 1%. In the centralized problem the 
manufacturer cost increases with more than 1% and the supplier cost decreases with 4.5%. 
 
After the above analysis the question of how to share the savings, the cooperation of the 
participants in the supply chain induces, comes on stage. 
 
5. Conclusion and further research 
 
In this paper we have solved two two-stage HMMS-type supply chain models: a decentralized 
and a centralized model. We have showed that the cooperation of the two players induces 
savings in costs. 
 
As an illustration for our results we have presented an exact number example. In this example 
the supplier’s cost of adaption in production to the fluctuations in the orderings of the 
manufacturer is higher than that of the manufacturer. Moreover, the production costs are 
dominant over the inventory costs. Therefore it is not surprising at all that in the centralized 
model the supplier has reduced her inventory level, and the manufacturer’s inventory level is 
higher than that in the decentralized model, and vice versa for the supplier.  
 
The reason of this fact is that the manufacturer minimizes her relevant cost in the 
decentralized model, so that her production level is near to the demand rate. After cooperation 
the manufacturer gives up to follow her cost optimal production strategy to allow the supplier 
to reduce her own production-inventory cost implying a decrease in the total cost of the 
supply chain as well, since the supplier’s cost saving balances out the increase of the 
manufacturer’s cost.  
 
This phenomenon points at the well known bullwhip effect of supply chains in a way: the 
supplier decreased the inventory level after information sharing (cooperation), and she 
adjusted her production rate closer to the demand rate. 
 
In this type supply chains the two players might have asymmetrical roles. It can happen that 
the manufacturer has much stronger bargaining position than that of the supplier or vice versa. 
To analyze the mentioned bargaining situation is left for a further research. 
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